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LEADING ARTICLES
DAMAGE CAUSED BY FOREIGN
AIRCRAFT TO THIRD PARTIES"
By DR. GERD RINCKI
I. INTRODUCTION
T WO problems are of particular importance in civil air law: the
rights of the passenger or consignor and the compensation of persons
who did not use an aircraft but nevertheless suffered damage on the sur-
face as a result of the operation of the aircraft. The rights of the user are
covered by the Warsaw Convention of 1929 as amended and supplemented
by the Hague Protocol of 1955 and the Guadalajara Convention of 1961.
Especially the Warsaw Convention offers a fair and adequate solution and
has met with world-wide recognition. However, the endeavours to enact
a world-wide convention on damage caused to third parties on the surface
have failed. The Rome Convention signed October 7, 1952' came into
force, it is true, on February 4, 1958, but up to now (October 1961) it
has been ratified or adhered to by only ten states.! The states which stand
out in the field of civil aviation have all refrained from putting the con-
vention into force. It appears therefore that the second problem in civil
air law remains unsolved.
Nearly ten years after the Rome conference, the time has come to
ascertain the fate of that convention and to attempt a prediction. This
article undertakes to uncover the reasons why the overwhelming majority
of all the states in aviation shrank from this convention. Inevitably linked
to this are some considerations on how far one compromise or the other
might be developed, thus perhaps promising better reception to a revised
convention.
II. THE NATIONAL LAWS
Some information on the principles of liability is found in the appendix.
It offers only rough statistics, but it evidences the general trend among the
states active in aviation. Liability irrespective of fault, the so called "abso-
lute liability" prevails in 41 out of 47 states. This far-reaching right of
compensation is unlimited in the majority of the legal systems. The com-
bination of absolute liability in certain kinds of cases and limited liability
in other cases-as evolved in the Rome Convention-is to be found only
in a minority of states, 15 out of 47.
Legal philosophy is certainly not a matter of statistics or majorities. It
should be noted, however, that the United States delegation stood virtually
alone in advocating a liability based on fault only. In evaluating their out-
spoken opposition against the convention, it should be remembered that
*On the Revision or Ratification of the Rome Convention.
t Dean of Law Faculty of the Goettingen University, Federal Republic of Germany.
a Official text in English, French and Spanish: ICAO Doc. 7379 - LC/34, Montreal, April 1953,
Conference on Private International Air Law, Rome, (hereafter Prot.) vol. 2, p. 247; English
text: 19 J. Air L. & Com. 447 (1952); French text: 1952 Revue Francaise de Droit Ajrien 423
(hereafter RFDA).
aFor references see column 1 of the appendix.
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even inside the United States the law is far from uniform. It is true that
liability based on fault exists, but a considerable number of states have
adopted the uniform state law for aeronautics without amendment. Section
5 of that law provides for absolute liability.4
One substantial shift in the grouping of states may result if the Soviet
Union should switch over to a system of limited liability. The Aviation
Code promulgated by the Soviet Union on December 29, 1961 contains
no provisions relating to our problem (which the Aviation Code of 1935
did). Therefore Article 404 of the Soviet Civil Code dated October 31,
1922 will apply. According to that Code absolute and unlimited liability
attaches to all damage caused by dangerous things such as aircraft. The
Civil Code, however, is likely to be replaced by a new one in 1963 which
will then rule one way or another on aircraft damage caused to third
parties. It can be anticipated that many of the Eastern states will follow
suit. If that Code adopts unlimited liability it is rather likely that the
Soviet zone of Germany, for example, will adopt the same system, while
up to now the law has been an absolute but limited liability in accordance
with the Rome Convention of 1933 (as is the case in the Federal Republic
of Germany). The adoption of the new Rome Convention has been under
consideration since 1960 within the Council for Mutual Economic Aid,5
so that the Eastern countries will probably all ratify or (what seems
more likely) all reject the Rome Convention.
. The present status of the Rome Convention and the national laws are
shown in a simplified manner in the appendix. This survey does not fully
explain the apparent failure of the convention for there were four main
controversies during the Rome conference-all of which had to be re-
solved by a majority vote-far from a substantial compromise. The four
problems are:' (1) The alternative between an absolute liability and a
liability for fault only; (2) The limits of liability; (3) National control
over foreign security (insurance) for an operator's liability; (4) The
single forum in respect of actions for damages. The question before us
now is whether or not new arguments or new bases for compromise have
appeared after the lapse of ten years.
III. THE CONTROVERSIAL POINTS IN THE ROME CONVENTION
A. Absolute Liability
At Rome there was always the same solid and overwhelming majority
of states which wanted the operator to be liable regardless of fault. Only
the United States delegation fought and voted for a liability based on a
presumption of fault.7 It was not supported by others.! In the years after,
official and semi-official statements in the United States denounced the
absolute liability provisions of the convention.' It cannot be denied, how-
ever, that the principle of absolute liability is recognized by most of the
3 See note, 28 J. Air L. & Com. 315 (1961-62).4 1bid.; 2 Prot. 74.
' COMECON, founded 1949 to counterbalance the Western OEEC.
'Garnault, 1954 RFDA 10.
'This seems also the preference of the aviation-insurers, see Wimmer, 1954 Zeitschrlift ffur
Luftrecht, 107 (hereafter ZLR).
' 1 Prot. IS.
9 Nunneley, 20 J. Air L. & Com. 89, 91 (1953).
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participants in the Rome conference, in the actual national laws and even
in a considerable number of states within the United States. And that
system appears only fair and adequate, for the "third party" on the sur-
face did not assume any aviation risk. He deserves better protection than
the user of an airplane. In order to relieve the operator, one might con-
sider, if anything, allowing him the defence of force majeure. More
specifically, the representatives of Anglo-Saxon law pleaded in Rome that
there should be no liability, if the damage was caused by an outsider, i.e.,
a person not belonging to the crew. For example, if somebody smuggles
an infernal machine aboard an aircraft and as a consequence the aircraft
crashes causing damage on the surface, the operator should not be held
liable. The same should be the law if a passenger tries to capture the air-
craft or otherwise causes damage. The convention of 1933 allowed a
defence on that line and provided in Article 2, paragraph 2, subparagraph
b, that there should be no compensation:
in the case of an act unconnected with the management of the aircraft
committed intentionally by a person not being a member of the crew, and
without the operator, or his servants or agents having been able to pre-
vent it.10
The United States, the United Kingdom and Australia tried in vain to
have this defence allowed in the convention. 1 It is in this connection that
the head of the United States delegation blames the conference for being
single-minded to the detriment of the operator.
Acts of outsiders are but a rare and highly unusual instance of causa-
tion utterly out of control of the operator. The basic problem is, whether
or not the operator shall pay damages even in cases of force majeure. The
conference discussed that plan several times but rejected it always as
being incompatible with the principle of absolute liability." This, how-
ever, is not an inevitable conclusion. It all depends on the definition of
force majeure. Every damage connected with the typical risk of aviation
should be justly compensated by the operator by reason of his endangering
other people by operating an aircraft. An infernal machine or a hurricane,
on the other hand, cannot be counted among the typical risks of aviation.
The specific qualities of an aircraft will perhaps increase the damage, but
the first and principal cause for the damage is always the criminal attempt
or the thunderstorm, neither of which may be attributed to the operator.
Therefore it might be considered fair and sensible to let the operator be
exempt from liability if he proves force majeure, or in common law
language, acts of God. The decisive point is to define this defence so that
all of the aerodynamical or technical sources of damage would fall on
the operator and only the atypical causes, which nobody could foresee or
prevent, would relieve him from liability. This principle is already the
law in quite a number of national statutes relating to automobile liability.
It could be formulated along these lines:
There shall be no compensation if the damage was caused by an unavoid-
able event other than a defect of the airplane or a breakdown of its engines
or devices. An event is deemed to be unavoidable, especially
'o Shawcross & Beaumont, Air Law, p. 508, No. 1131 (1951).
1 de Juglart, La Convention de Rome du 7 Octobre 1952, p. 57 (1955).11 Prot. 53, 57, 85.
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(a) if caused by the person injured, or by another person not employed in
operating the aircraft or by a animal, and
(b) if the operator as well as the pilot have administered all care as demanded
by the circumstances.
The burden of proof falls on the operator. Thus, an absolute liability
mitigated by the defence of force majeure seems justified for reasons of
ethics as well as technical development. It might open the way for a
compromise even with legal conceptions in the United States.
B. Damages By Noise
The convention denies compensation "if the damage results from the
mere fact of passage of the aircraft through the air space in conformity
with existing air arafflic regulations!" This bestows a remarkable privilege
on aviation. If the market value of real estate goes down because there
is a new air corridor and nobody likes to live underneath it, or if silver
foxes are frightened and suffer damages, the operator of the aircraft
will in no way be responsible. 3 This rule has met with serious objections
but it appears to be in harmony with most of the national legislations.
The owner of real property must tolerate airplanes flying over his land
and no action in respect of trespass or nuisance may be taken provided
the pilot complies with the air traffic regulations, e.g., as to the height
above the ground.14 If the passage is allowed, then the usual and un-
avoidable noise and interference cannot be objected to either. Our problem
begins where unusual or unexpected damage beyond the normal inter-
ference occurs. If the owner created the circumstances from which the
unusual consequences originated (e.g., by breeding over-sensitive silver
foxes) then it is up to him to bear the damages himself. That is at least
how some courts have ruled. If, on the other hand, it was the pilot who
brought about unusual circumstances (e.g., a sonic boom), then he must
pay compensation.
Such is the problem of the Rome Convention. The members of the con-
ference intended, in truth, to deny compensation even for unusual noise,
for the British proposal referring to "normal" noise was rejected." In
the case of unusual noise it can hardly be said that an eventual damage
was caused by "the mere fact of passage of the aircraft." The operator
will be liable, therefore, without regard to Article 1, paragraph 1, phrase
2 of the Rome Convention." Indeed, the convention is rather obscure
on two points: on unusual noise originating from an otherwise normal
passage and on the accumulated noise in the vicinity of airports, especially
in the waiting areas near an airport. 7 Since the convention was signed
in 1952 new technical standards have developed. It was several years later
that the sonic boom turned out to be a potential danger.'8 It could not
have been considered in Rome. Damage caused by the sonic boom there-
fore falls outside the privilege granted in Article 1, and consequently
makes the operator liable under the broad principle of the same article.
The convention apparently denies any compensation for damages re-
"For details see Rinck, 1954 ZLR 88.
"4Shawcross & Beaumont, 1951, p. 399 (No. 422), p. 430 (No. 467).
" Wilberforce, I Prot. 400.
18 Kistler, Roemer Haftungsabkommen, Thesis, Zurich 1959, p. 49.
17 de Juglart, 1953 Revue G~nirale de 1'Air 353 (hereafter RGA).
18 Roth, 25 J. Air L. & Com. 68 (1958).
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suiting from concentrated noise in the vicinity of an airport. That is the
wording and such was the intention of the conference. The United States
delegation, however, doubted even this and was afraid that the operator
might be overburdened with damage by noise. The United States proposal
for laying down rules on the liability of the airport operator would
encounter great difficulties since the legal status of airports varies greatly
from state to state. Generally speaking, the concise rule on noise, now
in Article 1, paragraph 1, phrase 2, is acceptable and indispensable. Never-
theless it should be clarified by interpretation or revision that would take
into account or include unusual noise and the sonic boom. All the legal
implications connected with -noise originating from an airport and its
waiting areas could stand outside the realm of the convention and be
left to the discretion of the national legislatures.
C. Limits Of Liability
Any debate on the justification and merits of limits of liability could
be infinite. It is not so much a matter of legal arguments as of legislative
discretion. The basic premise could be easily contested by asking whether
limits are justifiable at all. The third party on the surface did not assume
any risk, nevertheless he may lose his life or his health. Under such cir-
cumstances should he be denied full compensation? In international air
law the consideration is generally accepted that limited liability is a
quid pro quo for the absolute liability imposed on the operator. This,
however, is not a corollary, as shown by the mere fact that twenty-four
states have made absolute liability the law without any limits as to the
compensation due. However, the system of limited liability has been
recognized in air law conventions since 1929 but will not be discussed here.
The debate over the level of the limits on liability is heated. The
United States delegation considered the per capita limit on each person
injured to be too low, as well as the overall limit," although those limits
were approved by other nations and writers.2 During the conference in
Rome two big coalitions-so to speak-had formed. One comprised nearly
all the states where big airlines and leading insurers are domiciled. The
member-states of this coalition went all out to keep the limits low and
especially to fix a rigid ceiling irrespective of the weight of the aircraft.
The model for this was Article 8, paragraph 2 of the 1933 Rome Con-
vention. The opposition coalition proved stronger. The first object of
all those states which had joined forces was the protection of the victims. 1
The idea of a rigid ceiling was thus rejected. The bigger the aircraft, the
higher the overall limit. The maximum compensation provided for each
person was limited to 500,000 gold francs as opposed to 200,000 francs
in the 1933 convention. The debate over the extent of the limits is not
really that important. The statistics show that each year damage to third
parties on the surface is very rare and that the risk created by railways,
especially at grade level crossings, is several hundred times higher than
the risk in aviation." Higher limits could not therefore greatly affect the
premiums for insurance against third party risks. There is really no serious
objection against levelling up the limits.
" Nunneley, supra note 9, at 91.
'0 Le Goff, Manuel de Droit Arien privi 249 (1961).
21 Garnault, 1953 RFDA 9.
"For statistics see Rinck, 1958 ZLR 300.
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D. Forfeiture Of Limits
More deeply rooted is the antagonism over the forfeiture of limits.
Under what circumstances shall the liability of the operator become un-
limited, if at all? Article 12, paragraph 1 of the convention provides for
an unlimited liability only "if the person who suffers damage proves that
it was caused by a deliberate act or omission of the operator, his servants
or agents, done with intent to cause damage. . ..
However careless and utterly negligent the person may have been, there
should be only limited liability. Even if the pilot foresaw that damage might
result and even if he took the risk and just hoped for the best, there could
be limited liability only in the case of dolus eventualis. The wording of
Article 12 creates some difficulty for countries outside the common law tra-
dition. Some of the countries-amongst them Germany-differentiate be-
tween intent (French: intention, German: Vorsatz) and purpose (French:
dessein or malveillance, German: Absicht). Intent-as understood in
those legal systems-means that the person foresaw the result and ap-
proved of it. Purpose on the other hand denotes a stronger psychic engage-
ment. It means that the action was motivated by the desire to create
damage. European jurists especially think that only in the latter case
of purpose and motivation should there be unlimited liability, 4 and since
such a case will hardly ever be proved the liability remains limited even
in case of criminal negligence. This is felt to be unjustifiable," but it
would be more easily acceptable to a European legal mind if translation
and construction make clear that the damage must have been intended
but need not have been the object and motive of the operator or his agents.
This was the understanding during the Rome conference. The wording
was adopted in order to make sure that in all cases of negligence or
wilful misconduct, the liability should remain limited," while unlimited
in the case of criminal acts."1
The main concern of the conference was to avoid the rule of res ipsa
loquitur as established in common law countries. According to precedents
"intent" can be implied in the deliberate and reckless decision of the
operator or his pilot. Intent may also be proved by way of presumption
created by the fact that the pilot took off in spite of his knowledge that
something was wrong with the engine or that some equipment was
missing. In these cases, it is true, only limited liability was in the minds
of the delegates. Since the rule of res ipsa loquitur applies only in civil
cases, whereas full proof of intent is required in criminal cases, it is safe
to say that within the Rome Convention the law of evidence would be the
same as in penal law. Even before common law courts, intent of the
operator or his servants and agents must be fully proved." This is what
the delegates had in mind."0 A start in violation of safety regulations or
'3 Schnitzler, Vergleichende Rechtslehre 620 (2d ed. 1961).
24 de Juglart, supra note 10, at 103, 107; Kistler, supra note 16, at 60; Rinck, 1954 ZLR 100;
1958 ZLR 304.
25Riese, 1952 ZLR 125; Kistler, supra note 16, at 60.
" Leonel, Brazil, I Prot. 76; Friendly, IATA, 1 Prot. 82.
2 Poulton, Australia, 1 Prot. 79.
28 Hesse, The Aircraft Operator's Liability, Thesis, Institute of Int'l Air Law, Montreal, 1953,
p. 119.2
0 id. at 120.
" Poulton, Australia, 1 Prot. 80.
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with knowledge of some engine trouble gives rise to only limited liability.
This rule is not in harmony with Article 2 5 of the Warsaw Convention
as amended at the Hague. There the passenger gets unlimited indemnifica-
tion if the damage resulted from an act "done with intent to cause damage
or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably result."
Thus the user receives full compensation on proof of recklessness and
knowledge (for which the Roman law term is luxuria). On the other
hand, the third party, who did not agree to bear any risk, is in a poorer
position before the court and has to prove intent of the operator or pilot.
It is neither fair nor logical to favour the person who assumed a risk."
A certain consolation may be drawn from the fact that the Rome limits
are so high that in most cases the victim is not interested in unlimited
liability at all. The principle, however, remains shocking-at least to a
European legal mind-and compromise could be easily reached by adopt-
ing the Hague formula. The third party deserves at least the same legal
position as the user of an aircraft. Unlimited liability should therefore
be the law if the damage was caused recklessly and with knowledge that
damage was likely to result.
E. Single Forum
The problem of jurisdiction was the most controversial issue at Rome.
Eventually the majority decided that actions may be brought before the
courts of only the contracting state where the damage occurred." This
is probably the main reason for the failure of the convention as a whole.3
In determining the forum, two interests are clearly opposed to each
other. The victims prefer action in their home country and can point to
the undeniable advantage that all evidence is most easily obtainable there.
The operator, opposed to that, has a natural interest to be sued in his own
nation, if at all. It should be considered, however, that he undertook
transportation in a foreign country and thus, with respect to those activi-
ties, he submitted himself to the jurisdiction of that foreign country.'
To give a choice of several forums would have the big disadvantage that
the observation of the limits could not be relied upon. In different countries
judgments might easily be given, the total of which would exceed the
limits. How could a court, on the other hand, consider or comply with a
judgment pronounced abroad or a claim still before a foreign court, or
even future actions?
The conference discussed at length a proposal to permit an additional
jurisdiction provided that operator and victim had agreed to it and that
both were of the same nationality." This would open the possibility for
the parties to conclude an agreement to the disadvantage of, or even in
fraud of, other victims. This proposal was therefore rejected by a large
majority." Retained was a clause that an agreement as to an additional
jurisdiction is allowed if the proceedings cannot have the effect of prejudic-
" Garnault, I Prot. 85; Rinck, Gefihrdungshaftung 29 (1959).
3 Art. 20, para. 1.
"Nunneley, supra note 9, at 91, 100.
'" Toepper, Comments on Article 20 of the Rome Convention of 1952, 21 J. Air L. & Corn.
420, 422 (1954).
" Alten, Norway, I Prot. 190.
8Poulton, Australia, 1 Prot. 193, 195.
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ing in any way the rights of persons who bring action under the originaljurisdiction. This proviso makes the agreement practically pointless."
The sole competence of courts in the country where the damage oc-
curred obliges the operators to respond to proceedings abroad and abroad
only, for the convention does not apply to damages which occurred in
the operator's own country." The consequence is that foreign judgments
are to be enforced in the operator's country. It inevitably follows that for-
eig-n judgments must be recognized and enforced to some extent. Article 20,
paragraphs 4 through 12 establishes comprehensive but complicated rules
for that. Foreign judgments must be enforced unless-broadly speaking-
one of four excepttions is proved: first, if the defendant was not given
a fair opportunity to defend his interests;39 second, if there was a final
and conclusive judgment in respect of the same cause of action;" third,
if the judgment has been obtained by fraud;' fourth, if the foreign judg-
ment is contrary to the ordre public of the other state." These rules for
the enforcement of foreign judgments and the detailed provisions con-
nected therewith correspond in full with Article 2 of the United Nations
sponsored convention on the recognition and enforcement of judgments
concerning alimony and maintenance of children, signed at the Hague
on April 15, 1958. The international obligation to recognize foreignjudgments is still more extensive in the field of transport by rail.4
National laws as a rule allow the enforcement of foreign judgments under
the same provision with the addition that reciprocity be guaranteed. That
will always be the case in the states which are parties to the Rome Con-
vention. Thus far the Rome Convention is in line with national and
international law. Moreover and generally speaking the recognition of
foreign judgments is the modern trend in legal development and favours
the unification of law." The rules on the enforcement of foreign judg-
ments can therefore hardly be an obstacle to the ratification of the Rome
Convention.
The single forum remains the main obstacle. Searching for a better
rule on this point, two solutions are suggested. Besides the forum where
the accident happened, another jurisdiction might be recognized in the
state where the operator is domiciled. That was the rule in Article 16 of
the 1933 convention. The same two forums were recently agreed upon
by the ICAO Legal Committee's Subcommittee on Aerial Collisions. 45 The
drawback is that judgments pronounced under different jurisdictions may,
taken together, exceed the limits. This undeniable disadvantage may
be overcome by following a proposal once submitted by the United
Kingdom and Italy. Several courts may be competent according to that
solution. However, the defendant-operator who alone is interested in the
limits, may plead that all the law suits be transferred and concentrated
before one court. This plea must be allowed if the operator deposits with
"v Alten, Norway, 1 Prot. 489.
38 Art. 23. para. 4.
3' Art. 20, para. 5, litt. a, b.
40 Id. at litt. c.
41 Id. at litt. d.
42 Art. 20, para. 7.
43 Art. 55, para. I of the two conventions of transport of persons (CIV) and goods (CIM) by
rail, signed at Berne on Feb. 15, 1956.
"Smirnoff. 1956 RGA 20.
"' Art. 14 of the draft. ICAO Doc. LC/SC/Aerial Collisions, No. 71, App. A dated 3/27/61.
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the chosen court a security equivalent to the limits. The moment the
security is deposited the jurisdiction of all other courts comes to an end.
This is rather attractive for the claimants because they are now sure to
receive compensation up to the limit-if they win the action-and need
not enforce judgments abroad.
This proposal was rejected in a subcommittee for the apparent reason
that it is without precedent and perhaps because the subsequent with-
drawal of jurisdiction hurts the national prestige of some states." Hard-
ships and unnecessary actions can be avoided by establishing a time limit
for the defendant's deposit and plea. Thus the Anglo-Italian suggestion
offers the easiest practical compromise between the antagonistic interests
of operator and victim. This or a similar compromise means a revision of
the Rome Convention and should indeed be considered. As long as the
unique jurisdiction remains, countries of Anglo-Saxon legal tradition are
unlikely to ratify the convention."
F. Liability Insurance
The system of liability becomes worthless the moment the operator
turns out to be insolvent. That is why practically all states require the
operator to be insured with respect to his liability for damage to third
parties." Certain other securities may replace the insurance. This is also
the law under Article 15 of the Rome Convention.
Here the last of the great controversies over the Rome Convention
arose. This, we are happy to observe, does not involve disputes over legal
ethics or philosophy. From the several kinds of securities provided for
under Article 15, paragraph 4, the operators generally choose liability
insurance and contract with an insurance company in their home country.
The policy issued by the insurer must be passed on by all contracting states
as adequate security, provided that the insurer was authorized under his
national law and, furthermore, that his financial responsibility has been
verified by his state of domicile. This verification was highly controversial.
Many states, first of all the United States, claimed the right to verify for
themselves the solvency of each foreign insurance company.4' It was
but a feeble majority that voted for a weak compromise according to
which each state must recognize, for the time being, the verification of
the insurer's national authorities. The state overflown may, however, con-
test the verification and eventually bring the dispute before an arbitrative
tribunal or the Council of ICAO. In spite of this contest the state is
bound by the foreign verification until the tribunal or the Council gives
its opinion." This compromise must be credited to the French delega-
tion." However, to this day the United States has not come around to
accepting it and has even questioned the status of the ICAO Council as
an arbitration authority." It is submitted that these objections do not carry
much weight. If a state enters a bilateral agreement and thus grants com-
mercial rights to another state, it puts some faith in the other state and
4' de Juglart, supra note 10, at 153.
47 Nunneley, supra note 9, at 101.
4'Le Goff, supra note 20, at 239; de Juglart, supra note 10, at 112.
"' de Juglart, supra note 10, at 133.
5 Art. 15, para. 7.
5 Garnault, 1953 RFDA 12; de Juglart, supra note 10, at 137.
"Kistler, supra note 16, at 79 rejects these objections on good grounds.
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in its airlines and the first state may also be expected to extend that faith
and confidence to insurance companies in the second country. Passage
of foreign aircraft from states which have not signed a bilateral agreement
will be rare, so that one need not worry too much about their insurer's
solvency.
A new solution might be found by obliging the insurers to join one
or the other of the international pools. The insurance pool could then
guarantee the company's solvency in favor of the victims. The licensing
of such a pool and the control over its conditions of guarantee should be
vested in the Council of ICAO. This license would, however, grant a
monopoly or something similar. The ICAO Council would have to inter-
vene in the insurance business and keen competition and jealousy would
arise amongst insurers and interested pools. This system would there-
fore suffer from weaknesses as does the present system of foreign verifica-
tion under Article 15, paragraphs 5 and 7. The obligation to recognize
such verification for the time being is hardly sufficient reason to reject
the convention as a whole.
The liability insurance brings up another much debated problem,
namely the restriction of defences that may be put up against a victim by
the insurer. Under certain circumstances the insurer is liable to the
victim although he is not liable to the insured operator." Here a problem
arises in the case of intentional wrong done by the operator. Under
liability insurance the insurer is not bound to indemnify the operator if
he caused damage intentionally. That is the national law or is provided
for in the conditions of insurance. Under the Rome Convention that
defence is denied the insurer in an action brought by the victim. In that
respect the convention makes the insurer liable to a larger extent than
the national law does. 4 This divergence, considerable as it seems, is of
little practical importance. It will rarely be the insured operator himself
who causes damage by intent. It will usually be his pilot or another of
his servants and agents, and in such a case the insurer must pay even
under national law.
The insurer may not avail himself of any grounds of nullity or any
right of retroactive cancellation with regard to the policy underwritten.
He is liable up to a point even if the damage occurred outside the terri-
torial limits or after the insurance expired. These rules were felt to be
acceptable by the insurers with respect to the Brussels Protocol of 1938
as well as to the convention of 1952." Here the United States delegation
did not raise objections." Therefore, this carefully balanced system should
no longer be questioned. Summing up this chapter it is safe to say that
the rules in the convention covering security for the operator's liability
seem to present no insurmountable obstacles to ratification and do not
need revision.
IV. SUMMARY: WEIGHING THE INTERESTS
Surveying the reasons for the apparent failure of the Rome Convention
and leaving minor objections aside, four main weaknesses of the conven-
tion evolve:
53 Art. 16.
14Wimmer, 1954 ZLR 110.
55Id. at 113. 148.
"6 Nunnelcy, supra note 9, at 100.
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Absolute liability, chiefly objected to in the United States. A compro-
mise might be reached by allowing the operator to set up the defence of
force majeure ('not including specific aviation risks).
Damage by noise. Here the convention is not clear. It should be specified
that damage caused by a sonic boom must be compensated, while the
operator is not liable for noise caused during taking off, landing and
waiting above an aerodrome.
Unlimited liability for intentional damages only. Here the opposition
comes mainly from European Continental legal thinking. A compromise
might easily be reached on the basis of the Hague formula: recklessly
and with knowledge that damage was likely to result.
The single forum where the damage occurred. This is hard for Anglo-
Saxon legal systems to accept. Another jurisdiction might be admitted
according to the domicile of the defendant-operator. If the latter deposits
a sum with the court covering the limits, then this court alone shall be
competent to hear the case.
There are other objections. They could be met by increasing the limits
established under Article 11 and by providing that liability insurance be
guaranteed by some international insurance pool. These and others are
minor objections which really should not prevent ratification or adherence.
Confronted with this convention a legislative body could do one of
three things: it could ratify the convention, it could pursue its revision
or it could wait and see what other states will do. Weighing the financial
interests it is immediately evident that the interests of plain citizens as
possible victims are strongly opposed to the interests of the big airlines.
The state will protect its citizens best if it does not ratify the convention.
Then the legislator may establish absolute or other liability, may put up
limits or no limits, and require securities as he thinks adequate. This
national law will undoubtedly apply to all foreign aircraft causing damage.
The victim can be best protected if the convention is not applied.
The airlines and other operators are interested in ratification. In the
large majority of countries absolute liability without limits is the law.
A state can protect its airlines from unlimited liability, if at all, only by
ratifying the convention. Ratification makes sense only if the big partner-
states in aviation also ratify. Up to now they have not. Should the legis-
lator therefore decide to wait and see? Nearly ten years have passed since
the convention was signed in 1952. There seems to be no indication of
new ratifications in addition to the nine already effected. There is no
hope for a sudden change in policy or legal conviction within the big
states. Therefore we can see no point in waiting longer than ten years.
Two solutions remain before the legislator: to undertake a revision, or
to give up hope for a convention at all. Apart from publications in the
United States practically all legal writers who ventured to write on this
subject have recommended ratification.'" But there is not much to be said
in favor of ratification as long as the other states-and especially the
United States-refrain from so doing.
Practical considerations as well as the ideal of unification of law favor
the third approach-the revision of the convention. After the frustrated
57 Garnault, 1954 RFDA 15; de Juglart, supra note 10, at 176; Le Goff, supra note 20, at 251;
Kistler, supra note 16, at 107, Legal Committee of the German scientific society for aviation, 1954
ZLR 145.
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endeavours of 1933, 1938 and 1952, governments and specialists will be
reluctant to take up the same problems again. But some consent has been
reached in the meantime and new solutions are outlined above. The time
for re-opening the debate might well be chosen now, for the preparatory
work for a collisions convention has been advanced." Also that convention
makes no sense unless the Rome Convention or a new Rome Convention
is ratified at the same time and by the same states as the convention on
aerial collisions. Best of all, both conventions could be moulded into one.
The gloomy picture given here about the frustration of the Rome Con-
vention is based mainly on papers and books, while the considerations
of many states, e.g., of the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian coun-
tries, were not published. In order to create a reliable and comprehensive
basis on which to make decisions and possibly to initiate revisions, the
Council of ICAO should send a questionnaire to all member states (and
the USSR). The states should be asked whether or not they intend to
ratify the Rome Convention and, if not, to state their reasons for refrain-
ing from doing so.
The danger to third parties caused by aviation is too serious a problem
and the need for unification of law is too high an ideal for us to resign
ourselves to languishing under the doom of the Rome Convention.
V. APPENDIX
Liability for Damages to Third Parties on the Surface*
Ratified Liable For Liability Date of
Country Convention No Presumed Proved Unlt'd Limited Relevant
1952 1933 Fault Fault Fault Law
1. Argentina X X
2. Australia X X X
3. Austria X X 12/2/1957
4. Belgium X X X 9/11/1936
5. Bolivia X X 1/10/1939
6. Brazil X X X 6/8/1938
7. Bulgaria X X 1948
8. Canada X X X
9. Ceylon X X X 1950
10. Chile X X 10/14/1925
11. Colombia X ? 5/26/1958
12. Costa Rica X 1949
13. Czechoslovakia X X 9/24/1956
14. Denmark X X 5/1/1923
15. Dominican Rep. X 1/28/1949
16. Ecuadort X X ? X ? 9/12/1936
17. Finland X X 5/25/1923
18. France X X 11/30/1955
19. Germany X X 1/10/1959
20. Guatemala X X X 1949
21. Haiti X X X 3/24/1961
22. Honduras X X X 3/17/1950
" ICAO Doc. LC/SC/Aerial Collisions No. 71, dated 3/27/61.
* So far as more recent data were not available, this risumf is based on ICAO Doc. 7379-LC/34,
Rome Conference, (April 1953) vol. II p. 63-75.
t Defence of force majeure applied to landing and take-off.
DAMAGE BY FOREIGN AIRCRAFT TO THIRD PARTIES
Country
23. Hungary
24. Iceland
25. Iraq
26. Ireland
27. Italy
28. Lebanon
29. Luxembourg
30. Mexico
31. Netherlands
32. New Zealand
33. Norway
34. Pakistan
35. Poland
36. Rumania
37. Spain
38. Sweden
39. Switzerland
40. Thailandt
41. U. of South A.
42. UAR (Egypt)
43. United Kingdom
44. United States
45. Uruguay
46. U.S.S.R.
47. Venezuela
Ratified
Convention
1952 1933
X
X X
X
X
X X
Liable For Liabili
No Presumed Proved Unlt'd Li
Fault Fault Fault
X X
X X
X X
X X
X
X X
X
X
X X
X X
X X
1949
1942
12/29/1961
10/31/1922
6/3/1944
48. Yugoslavia X ? X 1949
Total 10 5 42 4 3 29 16
* With reference to damage caused on aerodromes, a rebuttable presumption of fault is applied as
against the operator.
ty Date of
imited RelevantLaw
12/31/1922
1929
1939
1936
X 4/21/1942
1/11/1949
x
X 12/27/1949
1/15/1958
1948
6/17/1932
X
3/14/1928
X 1953
X 7/21/1960
6/6/1957
12/21/1948
1938
5/21/1923
